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A Review of Sierra Leone's Mines and Minerals Act 2009
At the request of Oxfam, the Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment reviewed select 
provisions in the Mines and Minerals Act 
2009 and corresponding policy statements 
from the Minerals Policy 2018 to provide 
recommendations for how to best align the 
anticipated new mining law with international 
best practice. The following topics were 
reviewed:
• Fiscal regime  
• Climate change 
• Access to and use of land 
• Community consultations and 
participation 
• Human rights 
• Community development agreements 
The team completed a desk-top review of the 
following laws and policies. 
• Mines and Minerals Act 2009 
• Mines and Minerals Regulations 2009 
• Minerals Policy 2018 
• Local Government Act 2004 
• The Sierra Leone Environment Protection 
Agency Act 2008 
• Environmental and Social Regulations for 
The Minerals Sector 2012 
• The Income Tax Act as amended by the 
Financial Act 2015
• The Finance Act 2016 
• The Extractive Industries Revenue Act 
2018 
• The Financial Act 2019
In addition, the team interviewed key informants 
to identify practitioner perspectives on the topic 
areas outlined above.
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Many of these issues are now addressed by the 2016 
and 2019 Financial Acts (FA), the Extractive Industry 
Revenue Act 2018 (EIRA) and hopefully the upcoming 
transfer pricing regulations. Thus, first and foremost, the 
new mining law should align with these instruments by:
1. explicitly referring to the EIRA and relevant ITA/
FA provisions; 
2. at best complementing the provisions in 
the EIRA and ITA/FA, but at a minimum not 
contradicting them; and
3. forbidding any contractual derogation from 
applicable laws, and imposing a penalty for 
doing so. 
The following sections discuss the latest improvements 
in the fiscal regime including on investment incentives, 
transfer mispricing, ring fencing, and indirect transfers, 
while highlighting the remaining loopholes. It does not 
propose a new fiscal regime. It is important to note that 
the new mining law is not necessarily the instrument 
through which the relevant loopholes should be 
corrected in all cases.
Sierra Leone’s fiscal regime for mining is known for 
being particularly advantageous for companies, 
and has in the past failed to strike an equitable 
balance between the interests of the country and 
those of the companies.  This stems from a series of 
problems, mainly related to weak provisions in the 
Income Tax Act (ITA) and the Mines and Minerals 
Act 2009 on the issues of: 
• transfer pricing; 
• thin capitalization; 
• ring fencing; 
• head office expenses; and 
• incentives granted on a negotiated basis 
through mining development agreements. 
Definitions
Transfer pricing: the practice of using the multinationals’ network of affiliates to deflate prices 
or inflate costs including financial interests so as to reduce taxable income.
Thin capitalization: the practice of abusive borrowing, in particular through shareholders’ 
loans, to reduce taxable income through loan interest deductions. 
Absence of ring fencing: the practice of using the losses of one project to offset the income 
of another project when these projects relate to two different license areas.
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Fiscal investment incentives 
As a starting point, in order to discourage companies 
from seeking investment incentives on a negotiated 
basis, the new mining law should refer to or duplicate 
the penalty clause in the Financial Act 2019, section 
14:
“Fiscal incentives in any contract, contrary to 
prohibited tax and duty exemptions, awarded 
by a Government Ministry, Department or 
Agency shall be declared null and void.”1 
Tax incentives 
Tax incentives should be codified in the law, 
preferably in the tax law and administered by the 
National Revenue Authority
If tax incentives are considered necessary, the law, 
and preferably the tax law, should prescribe the 
circumstances in which tax incentives could be 
granted so that incentives are generally applied and 
are granted in a transparent manner.2 Tax incentives 
should not be granted by contract as alluded to by 
the Policy.3 
It has been shown that “mov[ing] tax incentives from 
other laws into the tax laws is a critical first step in better 
managing the use of tax incentives.” 4 Tax incentives 
that are established in other laws and by agencies or 
ministries that are not involved in the collection of 
taxes presents a moral hazard problem. This is because 
those agencies or ministries are evaluated against the 
quantity of investment that is generated, as well as 
the quantity of tax incentives that are granted without 
bearing any responsibility for losses of revenue that 
may result.5 The National Revenue Authority through 
the tax law should administer the incentive programs 
of the country.
If granted at all, tax incentives should be back-
loaded and regularly scrutinized, in particular by the 
Parliament.
Section 3.2.1 of the Minerals Policy 2018 suggests 
granting incentives in exchange for contributions 
to the sustainable development goals such as 
“developing infrastructure and value chain linkages, 
employment creation, knowledge and technology 
transfer, as well as greater use of local services and 
supplies.” This approach is certainly preferable over 
unconditional incentives but it could be as inefficient 
if incentives are front-loaded. Incentives should be 
back-loaded, which means they are granted only 
when goals are reached.6  Even if back-loaded, the 
use of such incentives should be closely scrutinized 
and should only be granted if the likely benefits 
clearly outweigh the expected revenue loss that they 
are likely to result in. See box above on Singapore.
Box 1: Singapore and conditional tax incentives
The Government of Singapore provides investors with a concessionary tax or complete 
tax exemption for 10-15 years provided they fulfill certain objectives on an annual 
basis such as business expenditure, the creation of jobs, payments to local suppliers, 
and knowledge and technology transfer. These incentives are provided in law and are 
available to all investors that meet the conditions. The Economic Development Board 
(EDB) monitors the fulfillment of objectives at the end of each incentive period. Investors 
that benefit from the incentives must submit progress reports to the EDB, and run the 
risk of having their incentives revoked if objectives are not realized.27  
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grading” is another risk that the Government takes when 
granting corporate income tax holidays.8 High-grading 
is the practice of increasing the rate of extraction or 
strategically extracting high-grade ore during the tax 
holiday period to reduce the revenues available to tax 
after the expiry of the tax holiday.9 
To mitigate these negative implications, the new mining 
law could complement the ITA by:10
• Requiring that a mining company’s taxable 
income is calculated normally during the tax 
holiday period, which implies requiring regular 
submission of the tax return and deduction of 
all depreciation costs instead of pushing their 
deduction beyond the tax holiday expiry to 
avoid extending the period during which the 
taxable income is artificially reduced;
• Putting in place measures to avoid the 
impacts of ‘high-grading.’ For example, the 
Government could agree to a tax holiday 
on a tonnage-of-ore extracted basis; for 
instance, Mali’s Mining Code 2012 stipulates 
that, if the production level exceeds that 
approved annually by the company’s board 
of directors by 10%, the generally applicable 
corporate income tax rate will be applied to 
the excess. If Sierra Leone’s new mining law 
were to include a similar provision, unlike 
in the Malian Mining Code 2012, we would 
recommend benchmarking the production 
level to the feasibility study rather than to the 
board’s decision, which may not be sufficiently 
transparent nor objective.
Ideally the new mining law would not interfere with 
the ITA and the next Financial Act would repeal the 
tax holiday granted by the ITA altogether. Instead of 
tax holidays, there should be incentives that defer 
taxes rather than waive them. It is preferable to have 
accelerated depreciation and loss, as well as carry-
forward, as is already the case in Sierra Leone. Over 
time, fewer countries have been offering tax holidays 
because of their limitations.11 
As a general point, the Government should review 
the extent to which tax incentives that have been 
granted in the past effectively lead to the realization 
of long term goals. This is especially important as:
 
1. ITA, section 32 already grants tax 
deductibility at 125% for training, export 
promotion activities and social expenses;
2. ITA, section 37 already anticipates a 125% 
investment allowance for R&D spent related 
to the project (at the exclusion of R&D 
spent on locating minerals); and 
3. FA 2015, section 24 already grants 
corporate income tax holidays for 5-10 
years depending on the size of the 
workforce and the minimum investment 
when there is at least 20% Sierra Leonean 
ownership in the company.
If such incentives have not contributed to the goals 
intended by the law (training, export promotion, 
job creation, etc.), the Government should consider 
reviewing how incentives are granted.  In addition, 
these expenses for which incentives provide an 
uplift should be externally audited, follow the 
transfer pricing regulations, and the spending 
categories should proceed from a plan validated by 
the national or local governments. The Parliament 
should be involved in this review.
Revise corporate income tax holidays
The Government should consider revisiting the 
corporate income tax holiday included in the 
ITA. Corporate income tax holidays are generally 
considered inefficient because they are only relevant 
once a mine is in a tax-paying position, which may 
be beyond the tax holiday period. In addition, 
they are deleterious because they can lead to high 
leakages if businesses reorganize themselves to 
benefit from tax holidays in unintended ways.7 For 
example, a company could choose to shift profits 
through transfer mispricing from older mines that 
do not benefit from tax holidays to newer ones that 
do benefit from tax holidays to continue enjoying 
the effect of tax holidays longer than intended (e.g. 
the older mine could sell goods and services to the 
newer miner mine at above market price). “High 
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Revise customs duty exemptions
We note the important amendment brought about 
by FA 2016 to customs duty exemptions. FA 2016 
reduces the exemption from 5 years to 3 years, and 
excludes spare parts, general vehicles and imports for 
resales from the exemption. Excluding spare parts from 
the customs duty exemption is particularly important 
to avoid discouraging the emergence of the spare 
parts business in Sierra Leone. FA 2016 also imposes 
a threshold and does not grant this exemption for 
businesses investing under the threshold of $10M for 
a new investment and $5M for an existing investment. 
While the intent of FA 2016 is to encourage large 
investment, by the same token, FA 2016 in fact hurts 
the competitiveness of SMEs. Further amendments to 
the ITA should address this issue.
Incentive packages must be closely scrutinized 
using fiscal models, cost-benefit analyses and by 
parliamentary oversight
Before deciding on an incentive package, the 
government should develop a fiscal model 
looking at the overall fiscal package to understand 
the effectiveness, usefulness, fairness and 
competitiveness of the incentive package. In addition, 
all fiscal incentives need to be costed in terms of 
their revenue loss; the government should conduct 
a regular tax expenditure analysis showing the 
revenue cost from incentives and exemptions, which 
should be made public and debated in Parliament. 
Finally, Sierra Leone should follow the regional 
debates on regional tax harmonization and actively 
collaborate with partners in the region to eliminate a 
race to the bottom.12
Stabilization clauses 
Another fiscal and regulatory incentive is the fiscal 
stability clause. The changes brought by EIRA 2018 
that limit the applicability of fiscal stability clauses 
to a maximum of 10 years (EIRA, section 40) are 
positive; it also prevents companies from having the 
choice to either benefit from fiscal stability granted by 
contract, or opt to take advantage of potentially more 
favorable tax arrangements arising from amendments 
to the EIRA or ITA enacted after the contract has been 
entered into (EIRA, section 41). To avoid doubt, the 
new mineral law should reiterate that contractual fiscal 
stability clauses are subject to the terms of EIRA 2018.
Transfer pricing 
We are aware that new transfer pricing regulations 
are being drafted. The new mining law should clearly 
cross-reference the upcoming instruments (to the 
extent the transfer pricing regulations are adopted 
before the new mining law is passed) and clearly 
indicate that these regulations must be followed in 
assessing both sales (Mines and Minerals Act 2009, 
sections 148 and 154) and expenditures for all projects. 
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 only requires the 
application of the arm’s length principle for sales, and 
this requirement only applies to holders of large-scale 
mining licenses that have a capital expenditure above 
US$5 million. This should be broadened in the transfer 
pricing regulations. In addition, we expect the new 
transfer pricing regulations to define “affiliates” and 
“related party” as these terms are not defined in the 
ITA, or in the Mines and Minerals Act 2009. 
Transfer pricing regulations are also expected to 
cover the risk triggered by multinationals’ use of 
offshore "service hubs,” for finance, insurance, 
legal, marketing, or IP development services. There 
is a risk that service hubs could charge the Sierra 
Leonean mining subsidiary fees in excess of services 
rendered, which would enable profit shifting to these 
offshore “hubs.” This practice and the possible ways 
of mitigating the risk is well captured in the World 
Bank publication, “Transfer Pricing in Mining, with a 
Focus on Africa.”13 The World Bank notes that: 
“While (…) [multinationals] exercise their 
discretion as to how they wish to structure 
their global business to achieve the best 
outcome for their shareholders, they must 
ensure that the degree to which the tax 
base of the source country is eroded as 
profit is shifted abroad is commensurate to 
the value actually added by their overseas 
subsidiaries.”14 
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be changed to align with the recommended Action 4 of 
the OECD’s Base Erosion Profit Shifting project setting 
a fixed ratio for debt as a percentage of EBITDA, 
the Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization (i.e.: the company’s operating income). 
For the mining sector, this ratio is recommended to 
be around 20-25% while the arm’s length principle 
should be applied to shareholders’ loans. A debt to 
EBITDA ratio is preferable over a debt to equity ratio 
as companies could subvert the debt to equity ratio 
by converting debt into equity or vice versa though 
transactions with affiliates.17 
Moreover, ITA, section 119(2)(c) and FA 2019 consider 
exceptions to the imposition of withholding tax on 
interests. The ITA leaves the exception at the discretion 
to the Commissioner, which is problematic. FA 2019 
makes an exception for longer-than-two-year-loans 
granted to aid export activities, for which international 
companies investing in the mining sector might well 
qualify. Withholding tax on interest is a key instrument 
that can be used to discourage thin capitalization, since 
this is a tax imposed on the interest paid on loans. As 
such, there should be discussions as to whether the new 
mining law should carve out the mining sector from 
these exemptions. 
Ring fencing 
Ring fencing is now addressed adequately by many 
provisions of the EIRA (section 4 (3) and (4) and section 
5). In addition, the EIRA has made necessary changes 
to the accumulation of deductible losses: the deduction 
of exploration expenses is limited to 7 years (section 
17) (whereas there exists unlimited deductibility under 
the Mines and Minerals Act 2009, section 155 (4)); loss 
and carry forward remains limited to 10 years (counted 
from the year of commercial production or the year of 
the incurred loss, depending of what comes later); and 
tax payable to more than 15% cannot be reduced (EIRA 
2018, section 8).
It is notable that the FA 2019 has taken very good 
measures to discourage this practice: it amends 
section 32(2) of the ITA 2000 by disallowing the 
deductibility of expenses related to "copyrights 
and industrial property rights in trade and banking 
services, technical, scientific and similar know-
how, knowledge and skills such as plans, designs, 
process“15 if payments for these services are made 
to a related party. In addition, FA 2019 repeals and 
replaces FA 2016, Section 37 by increasing the 
withholding tax rate on management and technical 
service fees from 15% to 20% of the value of 
services that provide “a taxpayer with professional, 
managerial, scientific or engineering advisory and 
other support services.”16 
Similarly, transfer pricing regulations should also 
address the issue of head office expenses, which 
also represent a risk for profit shifting. While 
this topic was addressed by FA 2016 in the Sixth 
Schedule (“where a deduction for head office 
expenses exceeds one-half percent of sales, 
any excess of such expense shall be treated as a 
dividend,”) it has now been repealed by EIRA 2018, 
with no replacement. 
Lastly, we expect the transfer pricing regulations 
to mandate private ruling or advanced pricing 
agreements for all transactions that do not have a 
reference price. Right now, ITA section 168 provides 
for private ruling but it is seldom implemented. 
While this might be because of an institutional 
constraint, the regulations could usefully specify 
when these rulings should mandatorily be used and 
their contents. 
Thin capitalization rules should also be addressed 
by the new transfer pricing regulations. The 
Finance Act 2016 has improved regulation of 
thin capitalization, for example, by limiting the 
deductibility of interest from shareholders’ loans 
using a debt to equity ratio (FA 2016, section 8). 
In addition, the EIRA 2018 limits the recovery of 
interest above the deductibility cap to 10 years 
(counted from the year of commercial production 
or the year of the incurred loss, depending on what 
comes later) (EIRA 2018, section 7 and 5). In further 
iterations of the FA, the deductibility limitation could 
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State participation
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009, section 162 
stipulates that the Government has the right to 
acquire a participating interest in the project on 
terms agreed with the license holder. While we can’t 
advise on a specific interest that the State should 
take, we note here a few principles to keep in mind 
for the new mining law: 
• As mentioned, it is never wise to leave terms 
to be negotiated;
• Dividends might be paid with a lot of delay 
because dividends never have the priority 
in payments–first comes taxes, then debt 
payments, and then dividends. With tax 
planning, the payment of dividends can be 
pushed off considerably;
• Paid up equity can be very costly for the 
government, carried interest by the investor 
can be accompanied by above market 
interest, and free equity is most often 
negotiated against a tax concession; and
• The revenue impact of state equity can be 
reproduced by tax instruments that are more 
certain, as explained in this IMF note.19
  
Indirect transfers 
Also known as change in control, indirect transfers 
in the chain of underlying ownership of the mineral 
rights is now addressed by EIRA 2018, section 9. 
Indirect transfers are taxed with a change of ownership 
equal to or higher than 25%. Moreover, any change 
of ownership equal or above this threshold should 
be declared to the authority. We are of the view 
that not only is this threshold too high (it is 5% in 
Ghana for instance)18  but that all indirect transfers 
should be declared for at least three reasons: 1) it 
can enable the tax administration to reflect on the 
feasibility of lowering the threshold by amending the 
tax law,  2) it will limit tax avoidance opportunities by 
empowering the tax administration to decide if/when 
the threshold has been reached instead of leaving this 
determination to the companies, and 3) it will help 
trace beneficial ownership as will be required by EITI 
from 2020.  While the revised mining law should not 
contradict EIRA 2018, it can circumvent this problem 
by simply deferring to the EITI’s latest standard and 
stipulating that it is applicable even in the context of 
change in control.
10 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
A Review of Sierra Leone's Mines and Minerals Act 2009
Aspects not addressed by EIRA AND ITA/FA  
that could be usefully addressed by the new 
mining law 
Annual Charges:  The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 
discusses the imposition of “annual charges” to be 
paid on the grant of the mineral right, as “may be 
prescribed” (section 152). The uncertainty embodied 
in this phrasing should be clarified in the new mining 
law by explaining which authority will prescribe these 
charges, when, and according to which criteria. This 
should not be left to contract negotiation.
Use of derivative instruments and hedging: EIRA 
gives a very vague definition that should be clarified 
in the new mining law.20 Companies could use the 
extracted minerals to hedge against the price of 
other minerals, for instance through the use of futures 
contracts. In this case the minerals might not be sold 
at the highest world price, as required by the Mines 
and Mineral Act 2009, section 154, thus reducing 
payments owed to government through tax, royalties 
and other fiscal instruments. The new mining law 
could stipulate that even when derivative instruments 
are used, all payments to the Government will remain 
determined as if the minerals were sold at the market 
reference price, i.e.: the effects of hedging are 
ignored as recommended by the IMF.21 This would 
be more effective than EIRA, section 7, that attempts 
to neutralize the effect of derivative instruments by 
stipulating that the financial cost resulting from the 
use of derivative instruments can only be included 
in the income computation if their financial gains are 
also included. The EIRA provision leaves room for 
interpretation, and it does not necessarily reduce the 
risk or impact of the use of hedging. It also limits the 
neutralization attempt to tax types indexed to income, 
ignoring that hedging can also impact the royalty base 
for instance. As for the Minerals Policy 2018, while it 
shows some awareness of the problem, it only invites 
the government to take a position on it.22 
Penalties for non-compliance with tax law and 
fiscal provisions: While the Mines and Minerals Act 
2009, sections 158 and 160 respectively include a 
2-year and a 1-year prison sentence that may serve as 
an effective deterrent, all the other monetary penalty 
schemes (included in sections 158 and 160 of the 
Mines and Minerals Act 2009 and in ITA, sections 154 
- 158 and 160 - 162) are too low to be a deterrent for 
an international company. All in all, there is a need to 
raise the monetary penalties to levels that incentivize 
international companies to comply with the tax law 
(and with any other relevant laws).  
Permanent Establishment: Permanent Establishment 
(PE) is usually defined in Double Tax Agreements 
(DTAs) and in the ITA. Its definition determines the 
extent to which a foreign business is subject to tax 
in the source country. The ITA defines the Permanent 
Establishment clause for all industries as: “Foreign 
permanent establishment means a fixed place of 
business of a resident person situated in a foreign 
country where the business is conducted continuously 
for at least 183 days, but excludes any place at which 
only activities of a preparatory or auxiliary nature are 
conducted.” 
The extractive industries present specific challenges 
for this clause that are explained in CCSI’s note, 
“Understanding how the various definitions of 
Permanent Establishment can limit the taxation ability 
of resource- rich source countries.”23 This is because 
companies sometimes use short term specialized sub-
contractors in activities leading up to the production 
stage and/or the supplemental activities involved 
in maintaining or terminating production, and 
these sub-contractors could avoid being classed as 
“permanently established,” and thus avoid taxation 
in Sierra Leone. They would do so by splitting 
contracts to stay under the 183-day threshold and 
fragment activities to ensure that activities fall under 
the exemptions granted to “preparatory or auxiliary 
activities.”
Because extractive industries are the mainstay of Sierra 
Leone’s economy, it is advisable for the new mining 
law to complement the ITA’s permanent establishment 
clause and reinforce rules that might be circumvented 
in the context of extractive industries. Ideally, though, 
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This anti-fragmentation rule and anti-contract-
splitting rules come from the OECD BEPS’ Multilateral 
Convention (MLI) which is an instrument that parties to 
a DTA can use to modify the DTA to avoid tax evasion 
and avoidance scheme. Sierra Leone only has three tax 
agreements in force (United Kingdom, South Africa, 
Norway) and the country could usefully engage the 
parties to the DTAs to adopt the recommendations of 
the MLI.26 The MLI’ s minimum mandatory standard to 
adopt is the Principal Purpose Test aimed at limiting 
treaty shopping by granting the benefit of the treaty 
only to investors that have a real economic purpose.  
 
this revision would occur in the ITA and in particular 
in the DTAs since DTAs override domestic law.
Provisions that could usefully be added include:
• Complementing the definition of the term 
permanent establishment and adding that 
a permanent establishment also includes 
a mine, [an oil or gas well if the change 
is made in the ITA], a quarry or any other 
place of extraction of minerals [or natural 
resources if the change is made in the ITA];
• An anti-fragmentation rule where specific 
activity exemptions (i.e. preparatory or 
auxiliary nature) do not apply when a 
company or a closely related company 
carries out business activities in one or 
more places in a contracting State, and 
either (1) one or more of such places 
constitute a permanent establishment 
for one of the related companies, or (2) 
the overall activity resulting from the 
combination of the activities carried on by 
the two companies at the same place, or 
by the same company or closely related 
companies at the two places, does not have 
a preparatory or auxiliary character.24
• An anti-contract-splitting rule: where the 
aggregation of time spent performing 
activities at a place that constitutes 
a building site, construction project, 
installation project or other specific project 
identified in the permanent establishment 
definition, as long as these activities are 
carried on during one or more periods of 
time that, in the aggregate, exceed 30 
days; or where the aggregation of time 
performing connected activities in a place 
that constitutes a building site, construction 
project, installation project or other specific 
project identified in the PE definition, 
if these activities are carried out during 
different periods of time, each exceeding 
30 days, by one or more closely related 
companies.25
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Integrate climate change considerations into the 
mining regulation
Sierra Leone is one of the world’s ten most vulnerable 
countries to climate change.28 With temperatures 
set to rise by 1-2.5°C by 2060 and increasing climate 
variability, Sierra Leone is particularly vulnerable to 
the impact that this will have on its economy, its 
environment and its people.29 
Sierra Leone is heavily dependent on natural 
resources, with agriculture providing employment 
for around 75% of the labor force, around 60% of 
which is at the subsistence level. 30 Sierra Leone’s 
natural resources are currently being threatened 
by rapid population growth, increasing energy 
consumption, and deforestation and water pollution 
from “environmentally unsound” mining activities 
and farming.  The changing climate acts as a “risk 
multiplier” by increasing climate extremes, and in 
the case of Sierra Leone, floods, landslides and 
droughts.31
Mining exacerbates Sierra Leone’s climatic 
vulnerabilities to the extent mining activities 
compete for fresh water sources with local 
communities, contaminate clean water sources 
with waste effluents and tailings, and contribute 
to deforestation which exacerbates soil erosion, 
landslides and flooding in the rainy season. As ore 
grades continue to decline and minerals need to be 
more intensively processed, mining will also become 
more energy and water intensive.32 This will in turn 
greatly increase mining companies’ greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. The mining of low grade ore also 
results in more waste being produced, that needs to 
be carefully planned for and managed.33
At the same time, the mining sector is also vulnerable 
to the adverse impacts of climate change. The mining 
sector in Sierra Leone has already suffered setbacks 
and economic losses from the damage caused to 
infrastructure and hindered operations by extreme 
weather events such as floods and landslides, resulting 
in lost revenues for mining companies and Governments 
alike. The multiplier effect of climate change on these 
types of weather events means that it is not only in the 
interest of Sierra Leone, but also the mining companies 
operating in Sierra Leone, to proactively mitigate, 
prepare for, and adapt to climate change.
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 contains no provisions 
to mitigate or manage the effects of climate change. 
The current mining law’s environmental provisions 
only include an obligation on mining license holders 
to carry on operations “in a manner that is reasonably 
practicable in order to minimize, manage and mitigate 
any environmental impact including but not limited to 
pollution resulting from such operations” section 132), 
and water and timber may be used “as necessary” 
(section 114). There is also no reference to water use, 
tailings management, or atmospheric emissions, and 
no requirement to properly assess, monitor or report on 
these in the environmental impact assessments (“EIA”) 
or environmental management plan (“EMP”). 
In this context, the 2018 mining policy acknowledges 
the impact of climate change (clause 3.9.2) and requires 
Government to work with mine operators “to develop 
clear and comprehensive climate change mitigation, 
response and adaptation plans for the minerals sector” 
in relation to the full mine life cycle from pre-production, 
to operation, to mine closure. 
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Interestingly we note that the FA 2016, section 34 
stipulate customs duty exemptions for the import of 
photovoltaic systems, low energy or energy efficient 
appliances that follow the standard of the International 
Electro-Technical Commission. This incentive should 
facilitate the use of renewable energies and energy 
efficient design by mines. 
The new mining law should implement the mining 
policy statement by including provisions to mitigate 
the effects of climate change, better adapt the mining 
sector to withstand climate change vulnerabilities, 
minimize the water footprint of mining activities, and 
better manage waste effluents and tailing storage 
facilities. Deforestation should not be allowed without 
the prior approval of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), and the discharge of waste effluents 
and tailings into surrounding water sources should be 
strictly prohibited.
Mining plan submissions should include requirements 
for mining companies to demonstrate that the 
proposed mine design and equipment:
• is the most energy efficient design to minimize 
energy consumption on the mine site;
• is the most water efficient design to minimize 
the use of fresh water and maximize the use of 
dewatered, recycled and treated water; 
• includes an effluent waste and management 
system that minimizes the risk of spillages and 
tailings storage failures;
• includes details on how a mining company 
intends to source energy from renewable 
energy sources to minimize its carbon 
footprint; and
• gives local communities access to renewable 
energy sources with arrangements for 
compensation.
The new mining law should require Environmental 
Impact Assessments to include the following:
• An assessment of the impact of the proposed 
mining activity on the following, along with the 
proposed strategy to minimize the impact: 34
o water use and waste water discharge;
o greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, 
along with the projected quantity 
of emissions in accordance with the 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol35;
o mining-project related waste such as 
acid mine drainage, overburden and 
tailings storage and disposal with the 
goal of achieving zero tailings storage 
failures; and
o vegetation and already cleared mining 
areas (from existing operations) and 
soil erosion.
• A model to assess: (i) the climate-related 
impacts on the proposed mining activity and 
(ii) the impact of climate-related risks on the 
proposed mining activity (increased flooding, 
heavier rainfall, drought), including the risk of 
tailings spillages and storage failures, during 
the life of the mine and post-closure. This will 
help to inform decisions around the design and 
placement of infrastructure and operations.36
The new mining law should specify a minimum list of 
items that should be included in the EMP,37 based on 
the risks identified in the EIA. The list should include, 
but not be limited to:
• A GHG emissions reduction strategy, along 
with updated reporting on CO2 emissions 
in accordance with the Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol.38
• An emergency preparedness plan to deal 
with environmental and climate-related 
emergencies on the mine site, including from 
flooding, landslides, drought, tailings storage 
spillages, and widespread disease.  
• Impact of mining activities on surrounding 
water sources.
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Public consultations conducted to seek free prior 
and informed consent (see section on consultations 
below) should include engagement on climate 
change risks and adaptations, and tailings storage 
and management so that they can also make 
informed decisions about the risks and mitigation 
strategies. 
The new mining law should include community 
access to a renewable energy source as one of 
the topics to negotiate in the CDAs. In addition, 
communities should negotiate financial as well as 
other relevant support to develop climate adaptation 
and resilience strategies, including to address 
impacts on livelihoods, immediate humanitarian 
climate impacts, and longer-term disaster risks.
We note that Kenya and Ghana have both deployed 
a policy and legal framework to tackle climate 
change that will soon be tailored to mining.39 
Sharing knowledge and experience with African 
countries that already incorporated climate change 
in their policy and legal framework could help make 
progress more quickly on this issue.
Water use
Require mines to minimize fresh water use and 
maximize water re-use and recycling
Climate change poses significant challenges 
to the availability and quality of water in Sierra 
Leone.40 The country has an abundant source of 
water resources, with seven major rivers connected 
through a network of twelve water basins,41 but 
rainfall is unevenly distributed throughout the 
country and highly seasonal, and infrastructure to 
collect and store water is limited, leaving parts of 
the country with severe water shortages during 
the dry season from October to April.42 Increasing 
climate variability is also resulting in less predictable 
and more severe seasons, with torrential rains and 
flooding become an increasing feature of the rainy 
season and drought becoming increasingly common 
in the dry season.
Water quality is also impacted by climate change. 
Water pollution caused by runoff of pollutants from 
agricultural production and mining activity is already 
degrading available water sources. An estimated 80 
percent of the rural population obtains its water directly 
from the boreholes, rivers and wells that are vulnerable 
to water shortages and contamination. Deforestation 
is increasing soil erosion, and the increasing intensity 
of summer rainfall is resulting in much higher runoff 
from sediment and mine effluents into rivers. Increasing 
temperatures will also increasingly impact water quality 
by increasing the growth of toxic algae blooms and 
waterborne diseases. 
Water is required at each stage of the mining process 
to suppress dust, process ore, cool and wash mining 
equipment, and manage waste tailings. Hard rock 
mineral mining is particularly water intensive because of 
the extensive processing and beneficiation of minerals 
that is required to separate the minerals from hard rock 
and other matter, a process that will become increasingly 
water and energy intensive as ore grades decline. 
However, fresh potable water is not needed for most 
mine stages of the mining process. Mining companies 
should not be competing with local communities for 
fresh water sources and should minimize the impact 
of their operations on the quality of surrounding water 
sources on which communities rely. 
Under the Mines and Minerals Act 2009, water can be 
utilized “as necessary for mining operations” (section 
114(e)). There are no restrictions or requirements on 
how much water can be drawn and from which sources. 
Prior approval from the EPA is only required if a mining 
company wishes to divert a watercourse, or to carry out 
dredging activities (sections 135-136). There is also no 
legal regime in place to regulate water use or allocate 
it among competing users. The 1963 Water (Control 
and Supply) Act requires license holders to obtain a 
water extraction license from the Ministry of Water 
Resources. However, in practice, this requirement has 
not been implemented and there is no mention of water 
permitting in the current mining law or any of the EPA 
legislation.43
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The new mining law should require mining operations 
to minimize their water footprint. This can be done by 
including provisions that require:
• The submission of the mining plan to 
demonstrate how a proposed mining project 
or any extension or expansion of mining 
operations has been designed with maximum 
water efficiency so that the need for fresh 
water extractions are minimized, water is 
recycled and treated before discharge into the 
environment (see Box on Western Australia). 
• A rigorous assessment of water requirements 
in the EIA, so that fresh water is only used when 
there are no alternative sources available such 
as water from dewatering, recycled water, salt 
water, and seawater. The source and quantity 
of fresh water extracted should be specified in 
the EIA and reported on in the EMP (see Box 
in South Africa). 
• The new mining law should not permit water 
to be extracted as necessary and, in the 
absence of a water permitting process, should 
limit water extraction to the quantities and 
sources approved in the environmental impact 
assessment (see Box on Canada). 
• The new mining law should require mining 
companies to minimize the discharge of any 
contaminated water into surrounding water 
sources and to treat all wastewater, including 
dewatered water, to an acceptable water 
quality level prior to discharging it. Mining 
companies that are unwilling or unable to 
comply with environmental regulations should 
be subject to strict penalties. 
• The new mining law should considerably 
increase the quantum of the penalties charged 
for environmental or water violations. 
South Africa’s water license allocation 
process
In South Africa there is extensive legislation to 
control the allocation and use of water. Mining 
companies must apply for water use permits 
from the Department of Water Services, which 
has the power to reduce the amount of water 
allocated to a mining project when there is 
insufficient water for competing users (such 
as neighboring communities). A full water 
monitoring program must also be included 
as part of the environmental management 
program that is submitted in order to obtain 
a mining licence.49 There are also regulations 
to govern water quality in mine usage which 
require mining companies to recycle water to 
the extent possible.50
Canada’s water license allocation process
In Canada, separate permits for ground and 
water sources are required, which are reviewed 
by the Ministry of Forests, Lands and National 
Resource Operations. If the use or diversion 
of water is likely to result in an adverse impact 
on water quality, a mining company may 
be required to submit a plan with proposed 
mitigation measures before a surface or ground 
water permit is issued.51
Western Australia’s water permit application 
procedures
Western Australia’s procedures for assessing 
an application for a water permit are the most 
rigorous in the world and should serve as a 
reference point. They “include an in-depth 
assessment of water source options, water 
demands, the management of dewatering 
volumes, the need for efficient water use, and 
the broader ecological, social and cultural 
values that may be impacted.”52 
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- Identificatio  and shared 
understanding of any critical 
issues that may affect approval of 
the project and conceptual water 
balance  
- Provides advice and information 
on the complexity of water issues, 
availability and known impacts within 
the area in response to proponent's 
outline of proposals
- Proponent prepares outline of 
proposal and consults with agencies 
to determine complexity of water 
issues
- Conceptual water balance
Stage B 
Scoping the Water 
Management Task
- Agreed scope of regulatory 
requirements and information 
needs for a license application 
and prediced water balance 
indicating major uses and 
sources of water 
- 26D license for exploration / 
investigation granted subject to 
assessment and conditions
- Provides advice and guidelines to 
the proponent to help determine 
the scope of the assessment, what 
information will need to be supplied 
to the department for assessment 
and preliminary advice on water 
management objectives
- Assessment of 26D license 
applications
- Proponent and agencies scope 
the assessment requirements and 
timetable
- Application for 26D license
- Conceptual water balance (noting if 








- Finalized hydrogeological / 
hydrological report detailnig 
water availability
- Development of conceptual 
water balance on water systems 
and use preliminary mine closure 
plan
- Environmenal review 
documenation finalised as 
a requirement of the EPA 
approvals process and EPA 
decision
- Assesses the proponent's application 
documents including hydrogeological 
/ hydrological reports and water 
management objectives and outcomes
- Provides advice to EPA and other 
government agencies and advises 
proponent with some direction if 
further work is required. 
- Proponent conducts agreed 
investigations and prepares 
appropriate hydrogeological 
assessment documents.
- Applications for 5C license for 
the mining project (and permit 
applications where relevant). 
- Proponent responds to submissions, 
undertakes required assessments. 
Stage D
Development of an 
Operating Strategy 
and Final License 
Decision
- Approved mine site operating 
strategy
- Nominal water balance for the 
mine site
- Issue 5C licenses (and permits 
where relevant) for the mining 
project subject to conditions
- Assesses license application and draft 
strategy
- Decides on appropriate terms and 
conditions for license after considering 
hydrogeological / hydrological reports, 
environmental information and other 
approvals including alignment to EPA 
recommendations and environmental 
conditions. 
- Draft operating strategy 
incorporating commitments from 
the EPA's assessment and approval 
process






- Leading practice water 
efficiency and management
- Monitoring and adaptive 
management of the water 
balance to minimize impacts 
from the mining operations
-Proponent finalises the mine 
closure plan before mining 
operations cease
- Ongoing assessment of monitoring 
and reporting commitments made 
within the operating strategy to ensure 
adaptive management
- Regulation as per conditions of the 
license including license inspections / 
audits
-License provides monitoring reports 
and other information as required 
during the term of the license, 
conditions and commitments of the 
operating strategy
- Confirm and improve management 
with evaluation of goals and targets 





- Decommissioning of water-
related assets, site rehabilitation 
and management of impacts 
beyond the life of the mine
- Makes recommendations to DMP / 
EPA about ongoing monitoring and 
reporting commitments
- Proponent implements mine closure 
plan (based on DMP/EPA guidelines)
↓            ↓          ↓
↓            ↓          ↓
↓            ↓          ↓
↓            ↓          ↓
↓            ↓          ↓
Source: Western Australia’s Department of water policies and guidelines53 
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The mining policy also makes no specific reference 
to waste discharge and tailings beyond reference 
to minimizing the environmental impact of mines 
and international best practice including the IFC 
Performance Standards, whose Performance Standard 
1 only addresses tailings in passing. 
Strict regulations are required to ensure that mine 
effluents, including tailings, are not directly discharged 
into surrounding water sources, that they are carefully 
and properly stored in TSFs designed in accordance 
with international best practice, taking into account 
the heightened risks of climate change. 
Mine Tailings - storage design, management and 
monitoring
Tailings are extremely harmful to the environment 
and local communities when their improper storage 
results in nearby water sources being contaminated 
with dangerous minerals and acid water, or a tailings 
dam failure devastates an area. 44 
Tailings are a major waste stream of the mining process. 
They are generated as a by-product when extracting 
minerals and separating them from other materials 
in the ground.45 They include ground rock and sand, 
heavy metals, chemicals used in the beneficiation 
process, and processed water.46 Tailings are usually 
discharged in the form of a slurry to a storage area 
called a tailings storage facility (“TSF”) or a tailings 
management facility ("TMF").  Tailings dams are the 
most common way to store tailings, though they can 
also be stored underground in dry stacks in mined out 
gaps by a process known as backfilling.
Given their chemical composition, tailings pose large 
risks to people, nearby water sources, the environment, 
and agriculture when they are not properly stored at 
a safe distance from local communities and water 
sources. There is also an increasing risk of tailings 
dams failures in recent years,47 which is set to increase 
as the mining of low grade ores produces more waste 
and climate change acts as a “risk multiplier” through 
increased flooding, landslides and torrential rains. 
The current mining law only contains limited obligations 
on a mining company in relation to effluent discharge. 
In fact, section 114 of the current mining law provides 
that license holders may (i) “dispose of any mineral 
products recovered”; and (ii) “stack or dump any 
mineral or waste product in a manner approved by 
the Director [of Mines] in consultation with the health 
and environmental authorities.” The draft Operational 
Regulations for the Mining Sector 2012 require mining 
operations to comply with international standards 
in relation to, among other things, the discharge of 
liquid effluents, solid waste disposal (overburden) 
that could seep into ground water, water quality, and 
river diversions. However, to date they have not been 
enacted.




- Identification and shared 
understanding of any critical 
issues that may affect approval of 
the project and conceptual water 
balance  
- Provides advice and information 
on the complexity of water issues, 
availability and known impacts within 
the area in response to proponent's 
outline of proposals
- Proponent prepares outline of 
proposal and consults with agencies 
to determine complexity of water 
issues
- Conceptual water balance
Stage B 
Scoping the Water 
Management Task
- Agreed scope of regulatory 
requirements and information 
needs for a license application 
and prediced water balance 
indicating major uses and 
sources of water 
- 26D license for exploration / 
investigation granted subject to 
assessment and conditions
- Provides advice and guidelines to 
the proponent to help determine 
the scope of the assessment, what 
information will need to be supplied 
to the department for assessment 
and preliminary advice on water 
management objectives
- Assessment of 26D license 
applications
- Proponent and agencies scope 
the assessment requirements and 
timetable
- Application for 26D license
- Conceptual water balance (noting if 








- Finalized hydrogeological / 
hydrological report detailnig 
water availability
- Development of conceptual 
water balance on water systems 
and use preliminary mine closure 
plan
- Environmenal review 
documenation finalised as 
a requirement of the EPA 
approvals process and EPA 
decision
- Assesses the proponent's application 
documents including hydrogeological 
/ hydrological reports and water 
management objectives and outcomes
- Provides advice to EPA and other 
government agencies and advises 
proponent with some direction if 
further work is required. 
- Proponent conducts agreed 
investigations and prepares 
appropriate hydrogeological 
assessment documents.
- Applications for 5C license for 
the mining project (and permit 
applications where relevant). 
- Proponent responds to submissions, 
undertakes required assessments. 
Stage D
Development of an 
Operating Strategy 
and Final License 
Decision
- Approved mine site operating 
strategy
- Nominal water balance for the 
mine site
- Issue 5C licenses (and permits 
where relevant) for the mining 
project subject to conditions
- Assesses license application and draft 
strategy
- Decides on appropriate terms and 
conditions for license after considering 
hydrogeological / hydrological reports, 
environmental information and other 
approvals including alignment to EPA 
recommendations and environmental 
conditions. 
- Draft operating strategy 
incorporating commitments from 
the EPA's assessment and approval 
process






- Leading practice water 
efficiency and management
- Monitoring and adaptive 
management of the water 
balance to minimize impacts 
from the mining operations
-Proponent finalises the mine 
closure plan before mining 
operations cease
- Ongoing assessment of monitoring 
and reporting commitments made 
within the operating strategy to ensure 
adaptive management
- Regulation as per conditions of the 
license including license inspections / 
audits
-License provides monitoring reports 
and other information as required 
during the term of the license, 
conditions and commitments of the 
operating strategy
- Confirm and improve management 
with evaluation of goals and targets 





- Decommissioning of water-
related assets, site rehabilitation 
and management of impacts 
beyond the life of the mine
- Makes recommendations to DMP / 
EPA about ongoing monitoring and 
reporting commitments
- Proponent implements mine closure 
plan (based on DMP/EPA guidelines)
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The new mining law should specifically address 
tailings storage, with the aim of introducing detailed 
regulations to govern the design, management and 
monitoring of tailings storage facilities (see Box on 
best practices). In particular:
• Mining Plan: Mining companies should 
be required to demonstrate that the 
tailings storage facilities are designed in 
accordance with the latest global safety 
standards on tailings management. The 
International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM) is working with the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) 
to establish an international standard on 
tailings facilities management. These and 
all following updates ought to be followed 
by mining companies operating in Sierra 
Leone. Moreover, tailings facilities are to 
be located in a place that minimizes the 
risks of spillages into surrounding water 
sources, particularly those accessed by local 
community members. Dam construction 
methods known to be high risk (such as 
upstream) must be avoided.48 Lastly, the 
mine design should incorporate remediation 
as a continuous process with restoration of 
tailings every 5 years.
• EIA and EMP: The EIA needs to include 
an assessment of the risks of tailings 
spillages and TSF failures, including the 
impact of climate change on these risks. 
The EMP should include an obligation to 
demonstrate that adequate monitoring 
capacity of tailings dam failure risk is in 
place; it should include both internal and 
external monitoring systems with the goal of 
achieving zero tailings dam failures.  External 
inspection systems should involve the latest 
technologies such as satellite based remote 
sensing, include report disclosure, and 
involve citizen monitoring.
• There should be strict and high penalties for 
non-compliance.
• The new mining law should prohibit the 
discharge of tailings into nearby rivers or 
other water sources, including underground 
where tailings can contaminate water basins. 
Best practices around tailings dam design 
and approval process
Best practice includes a mix of detailed 
tailings storage guidance and regulations, 
independent monitoring of tailings storage 
facilities, and the enforcement of financial 
and criminal sanctions for non-compliance.54 
In Ghana, a separate regulation governs the 
design and construction of tailings storage 
facilities.55 The design and construction of 
tailings storage facilities must be done by 
a qualified engineer approved by the Chief 
Inspector of Mines. The location of a TSF 
is also regulated. Each mine with a tailing 
dam is required to appoint an independent 
engineer to conduct yearly dam safety 
audits.56 
In British Columbia, Canada and New 
Mexico, United States, with the EIA 
submission, mining companies must 
provide a detailed description of how they 
will manage tailings as a well a justification 
for the approach. The tailings design 
can also be addressed in the discharge 
permits: for example, in Arizona, United 
States engineered plans for the disposal 
of wastewater must be submitted for 
approval jointly with the state wastewater 
disposal permit. In Nevada, United States 
a specific permit is required before the 
construction or modification of any tailing 
impoundments.
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The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 vests ownership 
and control of minerals on or under land in the 
State.57 This ownership structure is common, and 
aligns with laws that govern mineral ownership in 
most countries in the world, with few exceptions. 
While common, this ownership structure creates 
a tension between the State’s sub-surface rights 
to minerals, and land owner’s and users’ rights in 
land. This tension must be carefully regulated 
and managed by the State in accordance with its 
human rights obligations, namely its obligations 
to respect, protect, and fulfill the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms of its people as set 
out in the Constitution 1991, and the regional and 
international human rights instruments to which 
Sierra Leone is a party.58 The Mines and Minerals 
Act 2009 includes a number of provisions that seek 
to regulate how this tension is managed in practice, 
and the new mining law should aim to improve on 
the foundational principles set out in the Mines and 
Minerals Act 2009 and accompanying regulations. 
This section will consider key land-related 
provisions in the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 and 
the Minerals Policy 2018 with recommendations 
for improvement. It is important to note, however, 
that a new National Land Policy was adopted 
in 2015, which lays out a roadmap for updating 
Sierra Leone’s land laws.59 The Minerals Policy 
2018 helpfully recognizes that the National Land 
Policy should guide land rights-related matters in 
mining. The simultaneous reform of land laws and 
the mining law presents an important opportunity 
to align land-related provisions in the new mining 
law with the anticipated land laws to avoid one 
instrument undermining the other. The Ministry of 
Mines and Minerals Resources should coordinate 
closely with the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning 
& the Environment in this regard, and recommendations 
in the section that follow should be read with this in 
mind.
Terminology
Use the term "customary land owners and users"60 
rather than "legal and equitable owners of land" or 
"person who legally owns land and has title to…land’’
It is unclear what is meant by the reference to ‘legal 
and equitable owners of land,’ and ‘land owners in 
law and equity’ in the Minerals Policy 2018. The new 
mining law should avoid using these terms. Instead the 
new mining law should refer to ‘customary land owners 
and users.’61 Relatedly, we recommend amending the 
definition of “lawful land owner” in the Regulation to 
the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 (Regulations 2009).62 
The Regulations 2009 read: “lawful land owner means 
a person who legally owns land and has title to the 
said land.”63 This definition could arguably exclude all 
customary land owners in the Provinces whose land is 
not formally titled. Even in the event that new land laws 
do provide pathways for formal titling of customary land 
(as envisaged by the National Land Policy 2015), a formal 
title should not be a required in order for customary 
land owners to be considered "lawful land owners." The 
land laws of Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana and 
others recognize that the introduction of land titling and 
registration regimes should not delegitimize existing 
customary rights that have long been recognized as 
legitimate, merely for failure to title.64 This is especially 
so as land titling and registration is a resource and time 
intensive process, spanning years if not decades. For 
example, Tanzania and Mozambique enacted land 
laws in 1999 and 1997 that provided pathways for 
land registration; and while some customary land has 
been registered as a result of the laws, the majority of 
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customary land in each country remains unregistered. 
Therefore, we recommend that the new mining law 
and accompanying regulations amend the definition 
of "lawful land owners" to reflect the realities of land 
ownership in the Provinces by referring to customary 
land owners and users.65 
Consultation and consent
Improve the consultation requirements by requiring 
companies that apply for all exploration or mining 
licenses – including large-scale mining licenses– to 
seek and obtain the free, prior and informed consent 
of all communities and peoples who stand to be 
affected by proposed operations in advance of a 
license being granted
Currently, the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 and 
accompanying regulations require applicants for 
artisanal or small scale licenses to first seek and 
obtain the ‘consent’ of the Chiefdom Mining 
Committee or lawful owners or occupiers of land 
before submitting a license application.66 In contrast, 
the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires holders 
of exploration licenses (rather than applicants), 
to ‘inform’ land owners and users about general 
exploration activities.67 The requirement to ‘inform’ 
is a lower standard than consent because it does 
not suggest any opportunities for land owners and 
users to participate in decisions relating to the land 
that they own or use. In addition, the requirement to 
inform land owners and users is engaged after the 
exploration license is issued, thus confirming that 
land owners and users do not have any opportunity to 
participate in and influence the licensing process. In 
keeping with human rights principles of participation, 
it is important to consult and seek the consent of 
communities who stand to be affected by projects as 
early as possible, including before the issuance of an 
exploration license.
Source: Adapted from Rachel Davis “Enhancing Extractive Companies’ Respect 
for the Human Rights of Affected Communities”, Shift
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In addition, the new mining law should extend the 
requirement for free, prior and informed consent to all 
communities and peoples who stand to be affected by a 
project, rather than just requiring the ‘informed consent 
of land owners, in law and equity’ (as is suggested in 
the Mining Policy 2018). Land users and others who live 
outside the contract area may still be affected by the 
project, and should therefore have a say in and influence 
over decision making around the project. Liberia’s newly 
enacted land law includes an example of this type of 
provision in practice (see box below).
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 suggests that in 
the case of applications for artisanal and small scale 
licenses the grant of consent from the Chiefdom 
Mining Allocation Committee can displace the need 
to obtain consent of land owners and occupiers.71 The 
new mining law should either require the consent of 
the Chiefdom Mining Allocation Committee and the 
free, prior, and informed consent of all communities 
and peoples who stand to be affected by a project 
(including women and youth) before the grant of any 
mining license (if it is indeed appropriate to require the 
consent of the Chiefdom Mining Allocation Committee); 
or only require the free, prior, and informed consent of 
all affected communities including women and youth. 
In keeping with human rights principles, it is important 
that consultation and consent processes are inclusive 
with meaningful opportunities for affected communities 
to participate in decision-making. It is therefore critical 
that the new law does not grant the Chiefdom Mining 
Allocation Committee or relevant Chiefdom authorities 
final or sole decision-making power in these matters.
Similarly, the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 does 
not generally require a large-scale mining license 
applicant to obtain the free, prior, and informed 
consent of land owners or users before a license 
is granted; the obligation is merely to consult.68 
It is only after a license is granted that in certain 
circumstances the holder of a large-scale mining 
license must obtain the consent of land owners 
or lawful occupiers where the relevant land is: 
‘dedicated as a place of burial’; a ‘place of religious 
or other cultural significance;’ ‘within 200 meters…of 
any inhabited, occupied or temporarily unoccupied 
hose or building;’ ‘cleared or ploughed or…
prepared for the growing of…agricultural crops;’ 
or within 100 meters of ‘any cattle dip, tank, dam, 
or other body of water.’)69 While these exceptions 
are encouraging, particularly because they seek 
to protect cultural rights, the circumstances under 
which a large-scale mining license holder is required 
to obtain the consent of land owners and users is 
too narrow.
Helpfully, the Minerals Policy 2018 anticipates 
harmonizing the consent requirement, and refers 
to requiring mining license applicants to seek 
the ‘informed consent’ of land owners before 
issuance of a mining license (which presumably 
includes large-scale license and exploration license 
applicants). The new mining law should clarify that 
the consent requirement applies to applicants for 
all exploration and mining licenses, and should 
also align the requirement for consent with the 
more robust standard of “free, prior and informed 
consent” to measure up to international standards 
and emerging norms.70 
Liberia Land Rights Act 2018, section 33(3)
“… any interference with or use of the surface of Customary Land 
require the Free, Prior and lnformed Consent (FPIC) of the Community”
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Resettlement 
The Mining Policy helpfully recognizes that 
additional guidance and regulation of mining-
induced resettlement is required. New regulations 
on this topic should take as the starting point that 
resettlement should only be considered in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Where resettlement is strictly necessary, comprehensive, 
fair, and adequate compensation must be paid to 
restore the resettled individual or community to enjoy 
the same or better quality of land and living standards 
as was enjoyed before the resettlement. This is because 
numerous human rights are impacted when communities 
have to be resettled, and the Government has the 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human 
rights of its population. For example, cultural rights are 
implicated, as are the rights to an adequate standard of 
living, food, water, and housing, among others. As such, 
if companies are involved in resettlement efforts, the 
Government is under a duty to monitor and regulate 
company activity to safeguard the human rights of 
resettled populations. 
In the case that the Government compulsorily acquires 
land for mining purposes the Mines and Minerals Act 
2009 suggests that either monetary compensation will 
be made available to impacted communities or  if it is 
their preference, impacted communities will be resettled 
on suitable alternate land.78 The Minerals Policy 2018 
helpfully identifies livelihood restoration as the principal 
goal of resettlement compensation.79 Livelihood 
restoration necessarily requires replacement land of 
equal or better quality, and monetary compensation, 
and other types of support to restore access to natural 
resources including water, services, and livelihood 
activities. The new mining law should avoid taking 
the either/or approach to monetary compensation 
and replacement land that is found in the Mines and 
Minerals Act 2009.
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 also contains 
a provision that allows the Minister of Mines 
considerable discretion in deciding whether an 
applicant needs to obtain the consent of rights 
holders at all if, in her view consent is unreasonably 
withheld.72 This provision should be narrowed, and 
aligned with Constitutional protections against 
deprivation of property.73 The new mining law 
should remove the highly discretionary right of the 
Minister to decide whether the need for consent 
can be dispensed with in circumstances where rights 
holders withhold consent to mining operations. If 
consent is withheld and the Government considers 
it strictly necessary for the project to go ahead, the 
new mining law should require the Government 
to first consider whether the particular case fulfills 
criteria for compulsory acquisition as set out in 
the Constitution, and whether such an acquisition 
would be compatible with the State’s human rights 
obligations. Provisions on compulsory acquisition 
in the new mining law should align with the criteria 
and compensation requirements for such takings 
set out in the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991. 
The compulsory acquisition criteria set out in the 
Mines and Minerals Act 2009 while similar, do not 
align with the Constitutional criteria completely.74 
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009, for example, 
operates on the assumption that it is appropriate 
to compulsorily acquire land for use by the holder 
of a large-scale mining license.75 This suggests 
that large-scale mining is in all cases considered to 
satisfy the various criteria set out in the Constitution 
including that large-scale mining ‘promot[es] the 
public benefit or the public welfare of citizens 
of Sierra Leone,’76 which is arguably not the case 
in certain situations. In addition, the criteria and 
procedural rules for compulsory acquisition of land 
should be detailed in the new land laws,77 and the 
mining law should not deviate from a framework set 
out in the new land laws.  
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• The new resettlement regulations should 
include details of how disputes arising out of 
resettlement activities will be resolved. Access 
to effective remedies for affected land owners 
and users is an important part of planning the 
resettlement framework.
In the case of consultation, consent seeking, and 
resettlement, the Government and companies should 
be required to implement gender-responsive and age-
responsive stakeholder engagement that promotes 
the participation of women and youth.
Rental income for Landowners
Landowners should earn all surface rent income 
with appropriate income taxes levied as per Sierra 
Leone’s income tax laws 
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires the 
holder of a large-scale mining license to enter 
into a lease agreement with the ‘lawful occupier 
of the land,’ and pay surface rent for such rights. 
It is unclear why the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 
requires surface rent payments to be divided up 
between those who own the land, and other bodies 
including the District Council, Paramount Chiefs, 
Chiefdom Administration, and the Constituency 
Development Fund.82 In the case of privately held 
land, this would effectively amount to a 50% tax 
on rental income. The drafting of a new mining 
law presents an opportune moment to reconsider 
whether this division of rental income strikes an 
appropriate balance. In addition, the new mining 
law should refer to and reflect the new land 
laws that are anticipated to have important new 
provisions on women’s land rights. Such provisions 
may impact how and to whom rental income is 
paid, which could be reinforced by the new mining 
law.
Key things to consider when drafting new resettlement 
regulations include:
 
• Clarification of institutional roles and 
responsibilities for resettlement. The 
Government should play a central role in 
coordinating and overseeing the process 
given the Government’s obligations to 
safeguard the rights of affected communities. 
The resettlement provisions in the Mines and 
Minerals Act 2009 could be clearer on the 
Government’s role in resettlement.  
• The Government should put in place criteria 
and guidelines for ensuring that compensation 
is sufficient to achieve the goal of livelihood 
restoration. The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 
leaves compensation to be determined by 
the parties or by the Minister on the advice of 
the Minerals Advisory Board.80 This approach 
is incomplete because such a determination 
should in practice be informed by “detailed 
socio-economic baseline studies to develop 
a thorough understanding of every impacted 
household’s livelihood.”81 Public participation 
and close and regular consultation and 
collaboration with affected landowners and 
users is critical to designing and implementing 
resettlement plans. In order for participation 
to be meaningful, affected households should 
have access to all relevant information and 
studies, as well as legal and technical support 
so that they can engage in such a negotiation 
apprised of all relevant information to 
evaluate various compensation and livelihood 
restoration proposals.
• The rights of land users must be considered in 
addition to the rights of land owners, and land 
users should also be compensated for mining-
induced resettlement given the potential 
disruption to their livelihood activities.  
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Require license applicant to conduct a human rights 
impact assessment in addition to an environmental and 
social impact assessment, which can inform identification 
of affected communities (i.e. potential parties to a CDA)
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires the local 
council, or, if there is disagreement, the Minister, to 
identify the ‘primary host community’.85 But identification 
of affected communities should take place during the 
completion of the Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment ("ESIA') – before a license is issued. In 
addition, a human rights impact assessment should 
be concluded or incorporated into the ESIA to assist 
in identifying the potential human rights impacts of a 
project and  help to identify communities who may be 
affected by a project, and who should therefore have 
the option of being party to a CDA. CCSI has developed 
a methodology86 for collaborative human rights impact 
assessments that may be suitable for application in this 
regard. 
Require continual monitoring of project impacts to 
identify whether, as project operations change, new 
communities are impacted; and require that newly 
identified communities have the option to enter into a 
CDA if they so wish
Because a project’s activities may change over time, 
impacts may manifest themselves differently at different 
stages of the project. Because of this, the license 
holder, the Government, and local authorities should 
be required, by law, to continually monitor the nature 
and reach of a project’s impacts on nearby populations, 
and periodically review together with those populations 
whether additional CDAs with additional communities 
should be entered in to. 
Require that all affected communities have the 
option to enter into a CDA rather than limiting this 
option to the "primary host community" 
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires small-
scale and large-scale license holders to implement 
a community development agreement (CDA) with 
the ‘primary host community.’83 This suggests that 
if there are multiple communities affected by a 
mine’s operations, only the community identified 
as the ‘primary host community’ will benefit from 
the implementation of a community development 
agreement. The new mining law should allow for 
conclusion of CDAs with multiple host communities. 
This approach is taken in Kenya’s Mining (Community 
Development Agreement) Regulations 2016, which 
requires license holders to first assess the impact of 
its operations in order to identify the community or 
communities with which community development 
agreements will be concluded.84
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“…after registering with the country’s 
investment promotion agency, [companies] 
would periodically pay a mandatory fee 
calculated to cover the average monthly cost of 
a Sierra Leonean lawyer. Companies would then 
submit a consultation plan detailing how they 
will seek to obtain the free, prior and informed 
consent of communities potentially affected 
by the proposed investment. Companies 
would then carry out consultations and impact 
assessments, before negotiating leases with 
community land owners and a memorandum 
of understanding and agreement with the 
government. The fund would be administered 
by the District Council, with oversight by the 
Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone. 
Money would be allocated to pay a lawyer 
chosen by the community from a network 
of justice organizations and practitioners 
supported by the Human Rights Commission. 
The lawyer would provide “community 
justice services, including legal advice, 
assistance, representation and [...] education 
in the negotiation process” with the company. 
Proponents of “large and huge scale impact 
projects” would pay the fee monthly, while 
smaller projects would pay the same fee 
but on a less frequent basis (thus paying 
proportionately less overall).”89 
Mandate the provision of legal and technical assistance 
for communities engaging in the negotiation of CDAs, 
with adequate financing for ongoing support 
While the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires 
CDAs to be concluded between companies and host 
communities, and provides guidance on the topics to 
be included, it is silent on how such agreements are to 
be negotiated in practice. Sierra Leone’s National Land 
Policy helpfully recognizes the need to address the 
power imbalances that are inherent in a negotiation 
process between a company and a community in the 
context of land-based investments, and commits to 
setting up a legal assistance fund to finance legal and 
paralegal assistance to communities, landowners, 
and land users to support such negotiations.87 
Legal and other technical support should be made 
available during initial CDA negotiations, to monitor 
the implementation of CDAs, to review the CDAs 
on a periodic basis, and to represent communities 
in resolving disputes as they arise. This is critical 
to achieving equitable CDAs that properly reflect 
the priorities of affected communities, and that are 
successfully implemented in practice. The Minister 
of Mines and Mineral Resources has an important 
opportunity to improve the CDA negotiation and 
implementation process by collaborating with the 
Ministry of Lands, Country Planning & the Environment 
and other interested entities (e.g. Legal Aid Board) on 
the implementation of the financing commitment in 
the National Land Policy. CCSI published a discussion 
paper outlining possible financing solutions for 
legal and technical assistance.88 Sierra Leone’s Draft 
Guidelines for Sustainable Agricultural and Bioenergy 
Investment 2013 provides an instructive example:
ELECTRIC UTILITY ALIGNMENT WITH THE SDGs & THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT  A SCOPING STUDY
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Strengthen CDA monitoring and implementation 
mechanisms
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires small 
and large-scale license holders to "substantially 
comply with community development agreements 
under the Act."90 This provision should be amended 
to remove the word ‘substantially’ so that it reads: 
licenses holders are “required to comply with all 
provisions set out in community development 
agreements entered into under the Act.” The 
word ‘substantially’ in the current law weakens the 
obligation of license holders to comply with all 
CDA provisions at all times. In addition, in order 
to incentivize compliance and implementation of 
CDAs, the new mining law could explicitly state that 
compliance with the terms of a CDA is a condition of 
any small or large-scale license issued, and therefore 
a breach of a CDA is a breach of the license terms.91 
In the same vein, CDA reporting provisions should 
be strengthened in the new mining law. The Mines 
and Minerals Act 2009 requires license holders to 
report to the Minister on activities and expenditures 
in respect of a CDA annually, and the Model CDA 
sets out further requirements for the annual reports. 
This provision should be improved in the new mining 
law and require license holders to report on all 
license holder obligations in respect of a CDA, with 
evidence of activities and expenditures undertaken 
in fulfillment of those obligations. Each annual 
report should be reviewed by a multi-stakeholder 
group, which includes a representative group of 
parties/beneficiaries and relevant local authorities 
to validate the content. 
While the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 includes a 
provision that requires CDAs to include details of 
consultative and monitoring frameworks between 
the license-holder and the host community,92 and 
the Model CDA includes guidance on this too, in 
practice, monitoring and implementation of CDAs 
remain weak. Drafters of the CDA regulations 
should seek to understand the practical and 
political challenges faced when implementing such 
provisions and account for these challenges in the 
drafting of the regulations. 
The provision on funding for administrative activities 
set out in the Model CDA should be replicated in the 
CDA regulations, with specific reference to funding 
for monitoring activities. More generally it would be 
desirable to incorporate the Model CDA into the new 
mining law.
Identify/establish accessible and effective grievance 
mechanisms
For circumstances where license holders fall short 
of fulfilling CDA obligations (and indeed in the case 
of all project-related disputes), there should be an 
independent grievance mechanism that is accessible 
and appropriate for the needs of potential users 
(including women), to hear complaints. The findings of 
a report on non-judicial grievance mechanisms in Sierra 
Leone could be instructive in considering how existing 
mechanisms could be strengthened, or new ones set 
up, in the context of CDA-related or other grievances. 
A number of (non-exclusive) options for reform were 
presented in this report for consideration including:
“(1) strengthening existing institutions by 
providing them with clear complaints mandate 
and building their capacity on issues such as 
gender equality, fair hearing and record-keeping; 
(2) creating one non-judicial institution that 
deals with all types of land-related disputes with 
branches all over the country; 
(3) instituting one such body to deal with certain 
administrative or high-level disputes; and 
(4) establishing an institution that serves as a 
secretariat coordinating the dispute resolution 
work of all existing non-judicial [grievance 
redress mechansims]. 
However, it is important to state upfront 
that these are not ready-made and exclusive 
recommendations, but proposals to be explored 
in the context of policy and law reform and 
implementation processes”93
If there is ongoing work to establish or improve non-
judicial grievance mechanisms in the context of land 
disputes, there may be an opportunity to expand the 
mandate of such mechanisms to include the resolution 
of CDA disputes. If this is not considered appropriate, 
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any grievance mechanism mandated to resolve CDA-
related disputes must operate independently of 
interested parties, and thus it is not appropriate for 
the Minister of Mines to be the final arbiter of such 
disputes, as suggested by the Mines and Minerals 
Act 2009 and the Model CDA.94 Importantly, the new 
mining law, and indeed any CDA should not restrict or 
preclude access to the courts.
Include mechanisms for communities to meaningfully 
influence spending of community development funds 
in representative ways that include and give sufficient 
weight to the priorities of traditionally marginalized 
peoples including women and youth
One of the key objectives of the Diamond Area 
Community Development Fund, which was 
established to implement post-war transformational 
efforts, is to enable local communities to promote 
their own development agenda.95 The Community 
Development Fund was devised later but similarly 
to provide funding for community development 
goals as identified by affected communities. In 
keeping with human rights principles of stakeholder 
participation, communities should, in law, and in 
practice, have a voice in the development of local 
development plans so that funds are put to use in 
furtherance of community identified goals. Thus, 
the new mining law and accompanying community 
development regulations should include mechanisms 
for communities to meaningfully influence spending 
in representative ways and in ways that include and 
give sufficient weight to traditionally marginalized 
peoples including women and youth.
Detailed information on planning and spending 
should be made available and accessible to host 
communities. This could include, for example, holding 
quarterly public meetings with affected communities 
to provide project updates in culturally appropriate 
ways, and also include holding separate meetings for 
women, if appropriate, to encourage greater female 
participation in community development projects. 
The transparency and accountability provisions set 
out in the Model CDA should also be reflected in the 
new mining law. 
The Model CDA contains many provisions on the 
management of funds, with various committees to 
oversee activities. It is important to understand why 
there are still challenges in implementing inclusive 
decision making and oversight in spite of these 
provisions. This is important so that the new mining 
law and community development regulations can 
properly account for and mitigate the practical and 
political challenges faced.
Correct the percentage contribution to community 
development funds and require companies to publish 
their gross annual revenue in accessible ways
As is indicated by the MMA Reform Proposal Memo, 
it was originally intended that license holders 
contribute 1% of gross revenue earned per year to 
funding community development rather than ‘one 
percent of one percent’ as is set out in the Mines and 
Minerals Act 2009. Indeed, some companies have 
already entered into CDAs that set their contributions 
above the 0.01% set by the Mines and Minerals Act 
2009. The new mining law is an important opportunity 
to revise section 139(4) of the Mines and Minerals 
Act 2009 to reflect original intentions. In addition, in 
order to facilitate increased transparency, all mining 
companies that are required to enter CDAs should be 
required to publish their gross revenue on an annual 
basis in ways that are culturally appropriate and 
accessible to the public and specifically the community 
parties to the CDA. This may mean holding annual 
community meetings in which companies disclose 
their annual gross revenue and relevant supporting 
documentation so that communities understand 
how community development contributions are 
determined.
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Sierra Leone’s Constitution 1991 recognizes and 
protects the fundamental human rights of its people. 
In addition, as a signatory to major international and 
regional human rights instruments, Sierra Leone has 
binding international human rights obligations. The 
new mining law should not seek to ‘establish’ rights 
but rather facilitate and regulate their protection 
and fulfillment. For example, the recommendations 
in the sections that cover access to and use of land, 
consultation and consent requirements, and climate 
and water, are provided with human rights protection 
and fulfillment in mind. 
Closely related to the human rights principle of inclusive 
participation, (which has been covered in earlier 
sections), is the right to access information. The 
right to information is relevant from the earliest stage 
of a project– from consultations and planning long 
before licenses are granted, all the way through the 
project life-cycle. Taken together, the Right to Access 
Information Act 2013, the Environmental Protection 
Agency Act 2008,97 the Environmental and Social 
Regulations for the Minerals Sector 2012,98 the Model 
CDA, and EITI standards are important safeguards of 
the right to information. The new mining law may seek 
to consolidate information disclosure requirements 
in the new mining law for ease of reference (cross-
referencing applicable laws), but should be very careful 
not to narrow the right to information as expressed in 
The Government has the obligation to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the human rights of its people.96 
In the context of a mining project this requires the 
enactment and implementation of laws that prevent 
human rights abuses and provide redress in the case 
of violations. The Government must proactively 
monitor company activity in order to protect against 
human rights violations.
A range of human rights can be negatively impacted 
by a mining project. These include the right to 
property, the right to food, the right to water, cultural 
rights, the right to housing, and the right to an 
adequate standard of living. These rights are closely 
linked to and dependent on proper respect for land 
rights, and mining projects can affect the rights of 
men and women in different ways. If communities 
are voluntarily or involuntarily resettled to make way 
for a mining project, for example, there is a risk that 
the resettlement could impact a community’s ability 
to sustain its livelihood if livelihood restoration 
programs are not implemented, or if they fail. 
Resettlement may also impact a community’s ability 
to grow and access food, or the community may be 
relocated far from natural sources of water, affecting 
its right to water. 
“States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction 
by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to 
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, 
regulations and adjudication.”
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
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the Right to Access Information Act 2013 or other 
instruments. Instead, any protections of the right to 
information in the new mining law should be guided 
by the principle of maximum disclosure with positive 
obligations on public bodies and private entities to 
proactively publish information in accessible and 
culturally appropriate formats.99 In any event, the 
prohibition of the disclosure of information obtained 
under the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 should be 
amended to align with the Right to Access Information 
Act 2013. As it currently stands, the Mines and 
Minerals Law 2009 narrows the generally applicable 
right as protected by the Right to Access Information 
Act 2013. We recommend that the new mining law 
clearly states that any provision in the new mining 
law that prohibits the disclosure of information shall 
not apply if it conflicts with rights protected by Sierra 
Leone’s access to information laws or international 
conventions to which Sierra Leone is a party.
Civil and political freedoms have in the past been 
violated in the context of mining projects in Sierra 
Leone. It is helpful that the Minerals Policy 2018 
anticipates rolling out trainings for law enforcement 
on the UN Guiding Principles. The Government 
should consider incorporating relevant parts of the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
into such trainings and in law.
The UN Guiding Principles and Human Rights100 
should be incorporated as binding obligations in 
the new mining law, with appropriate penalties for 
non-compliance. The new mining law should oblige 
companies to respect human rights including rights as 
established in the laws of Sierra Leone and the regional 
and international conventions to which Sierra Leone 
is a party.101 The new mining law should also require 
companies to undertake human rights due diligence 
to “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how 
they address their impacts on human rights,” and put 
in place processes to remedy any violations.102 This 
includes tracking and publicly reporting on human 
rights impacts.103
“In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse 
human rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence. 
The process should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, 
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how 
impacts are addressed. Human rights due diligence: (a) Should cover adverse human 
rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own 
activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its 
business relationships; c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may 
change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.”
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, section 17 (a) and (c)
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